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Cultural Diplomacy with North Korean Characteristics:
Pyongyang’s Exportation of the Mass Games to the Third
World, 1972–1996
Benjamin R. Young
U.S. Naval War College Newport, Rhode Island, USA
ABSTRACT
During the 1970s and 1980s, the communist government in Pyongyang
sent Mass Games instructors to the Third World in order to improve the
image of North Korea abroad and promote its version of socialist mod-
ernity. The Mass Games, a huge choreographic gymnastics event of
100,000 performers, artistically exhibited the North Korean idea of ‘ilsim-
dangyeol (single-minded unity).’ In the era of decolonization, postcolo-
nial leaders in the emerging Third World turned to East Asia for devel-
opmental inspirations and some leaders, notably Idi Amin of Uganda,
admired the North Korean model of collectivism and discipline. The
Mass Games, epitomized the communalistic values of North Korean pol-
itical culture, and Pyongyang soon spread the exercises all over Africa
via the exportation of instructors. Using U.S. diplomatic reports, South
Korean archival documents, and North Korean press reports, this article
argues that the dissemination of the North Korean Mass Games to the
Third World circulated ideas of self-reliance, national harmony, and pat-
riotism but also introduced Pyongyang’s mechanisms of social control,
such as state-run cultural performances and involuntary mass participa-
tion in artistic events.
KEYWORDS
North Korea; East Asia;
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Featuring a backdrop of thousands of schoolchildren holding placards with revolutionary slogans
and skilled gymnasts in the foreground performing choreographed dances and acrobatic moves,
Stalinist music rings throughout the stadium in North Korea’s capital city of Pyongyang. This was
the scene of North Korea’s first Mass Games event in 1946.1 In North Korea, officially known as
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Mass Games was and still remains a mas-
sive choreographed and rhythmic gymnastics event that is designed to promote discipline, col-
lectivism, physical fitness, and above all, loyalty to the state. The propagandistic performance
includes chapters of Korea’s history from its woeful status as an oppressed Japanese colony to
its glorious rise as a strong and independent nation-state led by the Great Leader, North Korea’s
founder Kim Il Sung. As a means to foster national pride and unity amongst the people, the
Mass Games artistically tells the story of the postcolonial nation state from its inception as a piti-
ful exploited colony to its almost utopian ascent as an industrialized power that stands on its
own sovereign feet. This future-oriented artistic style was later exported to other postcolonial
nation states in the decolonizing world by the regime in Pyongyang.2
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In the DPRK, Kim Il Sung used the Mass Games as a way to mobilize the youth and showcase
his regime’s absolute authority. The DPRK’s Vice Chairman of the Mass Gymnastics Production
Company Kim Jong Ho, said the Mass Games ‘represents the ideological theme of the country
and nation splendidly through the combination of gymnastics formations, backdrops involving
tens of thousands of people, and music’ and, that unlike sports where athletes compete for a
prize, the Mass Games ‘brings pleasure and satisfaction to the performers as well as to the audi-
ence, and instills in their hearts hope for the future.’3 As a former anti-Japanese guerilla fighter,
Kim Il Sung’s expertise was primarily in the realm of military affairs. The artistic authority within
the Kim family regime was his son and successor Kim Jong Il who took a special interest in fur-
ther developing his father’s Mass Games. For example, in 1987, Kim Jong Il told a group of North
Korean Mass Games experts, ‘To be a fully developed communist man, one must acquire a revo-
lutionary ideology, the knowledge of many fields, rich cultural attainments and a healthy and
strong physique… Mass gymnastics play an important role in training schoolchildren to acquire
these communist qualities.’4 Kim Jong Il emphasized that the Mass Games equipped participants
with the Korean Workers’ Party’s concept of Juche.
Often defined as self-reliance, Juche is a North Korean value system allegedly created by Kim
Il Sung that emphasizes independence, autarky, and self-sufficiency.5 As North Korea cleverly
navigated the Sino-Soviet split of the Communist Bloc, the regime in Pyongyang developed its
own policy of national autonomy under the rubric of the ‘Juche Idea.’6 The regime later exported
this concept to the decolonizing world as an international solution to the problems of neo-colo-
nialism and foreign domination.7 As Kim Il Sung told a Japanese journalist in 1972, ‘In a nutshell,
the idea of Juche means that the masters of the revolution and the work of construction are the
masses of the people.’8 Thus, Juche’s focus on the ‘masses’ as a revolutionary force in world pol-
itics naturally meshed with the tenets of the Mass Games: collectivism, organization, and mobil-
ization. In his 1987 speech, Kim Jong Il said, ‘Through mass gymnastic performances, the Party
members and other working people are firmly equipped with our Party’s Juche idea, and the val-
idity and great vitality of our Party’s lines and policies, the embodiment of the idea, are demon-
strated far and wide at home and abroad.’ Kim Jong Il later added in speech, ‘Only when you
deal with the Juche idea and the Party’s lines and policies properly in your works can you pro-
duce genuine mass gymnastics that can actively contribute to the revolution and construction.’9
The Mass Games in North Korea were a vehicle for disseminating Kim Il Sung’s Juche idea and
thus further consolidating the Kim family regime’s absolute autocracy.
Despite the supposedly closed nature of the North Korean state, Pyongyang appropriated and
reformulated this artistic brand of collectivist culture from other authoritarian regimes in Central
and Eastern Europe. Stylistically, the major difference between European-style Mass Games and
the North Korean ones was the use of a backdrop featuring schoolchildren holding placards and
the grandiose scale of the ones in Pyongyang. The regime in Pyongyang then exported their
unique style of the Mass Games, often free of charge, to Third World countries during the Cold
War era via teams of North Korean instructors and gymnasts. Thus, the Mass Games presents a
unique window into North Korea’s soft power. As Kim Jong Il described, ‘Mass gymnastics make
an active contribution to the development of friendly relations with other countries. Many mass
gymnastic performances are now shown to foreign visitors to our country, and our experts are
sent abroad to produce and disseminate mass gymnastics.’ He continued, ‘In the course of this,
trust between our country and other countries are deepened, and exchanges steadily strengthen
ties of friendship, as they support and encourage each other.’10 In other words, the Mass Games
were an important tool of Pyongyang’s foreign policy and diplomatic efforts with Third World
countries during the Cold War era. They expressed North Korean solidarity and articulated
Pyongyang’s unique Juche value system in an artistic format. With its emphasis on discipline,
national unity, and communalism, the Mass Games were a creative expression of North Korea’s
socialist values.
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Contrary to the contemporary labels placed on the DPRK as ‘secretive,’ ‘remote,’ and ‘rogue,’
North Korea during the Cold War era was a highly active agent on the international scene that
both embraced and exported the particular mode of collectivist culture known as the Mass
Games. Using documents from the U.S. National Archives and South Korean Diplomatic Archives,
North Korean press reports and literature, and oral history interviews, this cultural and diplomatic
history is the first comprehensive study to specifically focus on the DPRK’s exportation of the
Mass Games to the Third World during the Cold War era.11 This article challenges the notion of
the DPRK as inward looking, hermitic, and isolated and uses the exportation of the Mass Games
to the Third World as a way to historicize North Korea as an internationalist state during the
Cold War era.
Third Worldism in the ‘Hermit Kingdom’
First coined by French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952, the term ‘Third World’ referred to
non-aligned countries and was compared to the Third Estate, the common people, of the French
Ancien Regime.12 In 1955, the Bandung Conference in Indonesia brought together for the first
time heads of state from the decolonizing Afro-Asian world.13 With this historic event, Third
World started to take shape as a real political force and the term was further plunged into global
revolutionary discourse with the 1961 publication of Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth.14 As
Vijay Prashad explains, the Third World was not a geographic area but a global project that pri-
oritized anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.15 It was a reaction to Cold War bipolarity, the rise
of revolutionary nationalisms, and the sudden overthrow of imperialist regimes by national liber-
ation movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Unlike the negative connotation associated
with the term ‘Third World’ today, those in the decolonizing world, which sought an alternative
system different from U.S.-style liberal democracy and Soviet-style socialism, used the word
proudly during the Cold War era. As a postcolonial communist state, North Korea used the term,
‘Third World,’ in its own propaganda as it had one foot in the anti-colonial Third World and the
other in the socialist Second World.16 The Third World was also an important site of inter-Korean
competition for the governments in Seoul and Pyongyang as newly independent countries
developed in the decolonizing world.17 Thus, Pyongyang functioned as a unique hub of socialist
cooperation and Third Worldism during the Cold War era.
With the opening of former Eastern bloc archives in the 1990s, a new Cold War history
emerged that reframed communist powers as rational actors and smaller nations as having
agency and not acting as mere proxies of the world’s superpowers.18 Recently, the Third World
has received considerable attention by historians as a battleground of ideologies and develop-
mental theories during the Cold War era.19 While North Korean archives remain closed to
researchers, this article uses South Korean archival documents, U.S. diplomatic wires, and North
Korean press reports to shed light on Pyongyang’s dissemination of the Mass Games to the
Third World. Since Pyongyang could not compete with the economically resurgent Republic of
Korea (ROK, the official title of South Korea) when it came to sending financial aid to the Third
World in the 1970s and 1980s, the Kim family regime exported specific niches, such as the Mass
Games. This event, which promoted youth mobilization and loyalty to the state, appealed to
postcolonial governments seeking quick solutions to their developmental crises of state legitim-
acy and fostering political support amongst the masses.
Many nascent leaders in the Third World, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, also understood
the power of the Mass Games in mobilizing youth populations and fostering patriotism during
the era of decolonization. Thus, they sought North Korean assistance in forming their own local
versions. According to a 2002 North Korean book, the DPRK government sent Mass Games
instructors to 48 different countries, most of which were located in the Third World, on ninety-
four different occasions.20 Beginning in the mid-1970s, North Korea exported this particular type
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of collectivist culture to sub-Saharan Africa as a way to spread the virtues of the Kim family
regime and promote the ideals of the proper socialist citizen, such as selflessness, patriotism,
and comradeship. The Mass Games was an artistic manifestation of North Korea’s authoritarian
‘single-minded unity (ilsim-dangyeol)’ concept.21 As article 63 of North Korea’s Constitution states,
‘In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea the rights and duties of citizens are based on the
collectivist principle, “One for all and all for one.”’22
Historical context of the mass games
The Mass Games in the DPRK were massive as they typically included over 100,000 performers
and involved months of brutally intense preparation.23 Due to their sheer size and grandiosity,
North Korea’s Mass Games has received considerable attention from foreign observers and have
been a frequent sight of intrigue for Western tourists visiting the DPRK.24 As North Korea’s top
Mass Games planner Hong Si Gun said to a Wall Street Journal reporter in 1989, ‘We don’t say
our mass games are the first in the world, but many heads of state and tourists from other coun-
tries have seen them and says ours are the best.’25 The DPRK’s style of Mass Games, with its
emphasis on grandiosity and precision, later acquired such an international reputation that they
even taught their Chinese neighbors how to perform mass gymnastic pieces. Chen Weiya, a
Chinese director famous internationally for his choreography of large events such as the opening
ceremonies of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, said of a May 2001 North Korean-instructed
performance in Beijing, ‘This is a piece of very high quality which cannot be produced by either
the United States or Australia. Such a great piece can be created only by the [North] Korean spe-
cialists.’26 North Korea’s Mass Games bolstered the Kim family regime’s international status
and prestige.
The proliferation of North Korea’s Mass Games began in Somalia and then soon spread
throughout sub-Saharan Africa during the 1970s, 1980s, and even into the 1990s. The most
intense exposure to the North Korean-style Mass Games occurred in Idi Amin’s Uganda, which
sought the same social control and mass mobilization mechanisms wielded by Pyongyang.
However, the Mass Games often encountered resistance from locals that disliked the foreign
communist essence of these artistic demonstrations. This piece roughly follows a chronological
approach and analyzes the dissemination of the Mass Games throughout the decolonizing world.
Mass games take hold in Somalia and Uganda
The first foreign leader to recognize the value of North Korea’s version of the Mass Games was
Somali leader Siad Barre, who visited the DPRK in 1971. However, diplomatic ties between
Somalia and North Korea began 4 years earlier when a North Korean delegation visited Somalia
in early 1967 and established diplomatic relations with Aden Abdulle Osman Daar’s government.
At a dinner party honoring the North Korean delegation, President of the Somali National
Assembly Sheikh Mukhtar Mohamed Hussein said, ‘The dimensions of the historical tragedy,
engineered by imperialists in our countries and our peoples have suffered from its bitterness
and ferocity, is manifested in dividing great Korea into two parts and peaceful Somalia into five
parts.’27 Two years later, Somali military general Siad Barre ousted the democratic government in
a bloodless coup. Barre visited the DPRK for the first time in 1971 and met Kim Il Sung.28 Shortly
after returning from the DPRK and with the help of the Somali Supreme Revolutionary Council’s
commanding officer Abdirizak Mohamud Abubakar, the two established a pervasive personality
cult based on the Kim Il Sung model. Similar to the North Korean leader, Barre assumed titles
that stressed his greatness and absolute authority, such as the ‘father of wisdom,’ ‘father of the
nation,’ and ‘teacher of the revolution.’29 In 1972, a joint communique was signed between
North Korea and Somalia in which ‘both sides expressed their firm convictions that the only way
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to liberate Southern Africa and other colonially held territories is by waging an
armed struggle.’30
In addition to adopting Kim Il Sung-style titles and a DPRK-inspired personality cult, Barre also
borrowed North Korea’s mass gymnastics event. According to Somalia scholar I.M Lewis,
‘Wherever he went, the President was greeted by mass applause and adulation, feted and
saluted by his loyal subjects who literally danced before him—to [North] Korean choreography.’
Lewis recalled that the ‘intriguingly oriental flavor’ of this extravagant state pageantry conflicted
with the traditional egalitarian ways of pastoral Somali society.31 Islamic influences in Somalia
with its position of the Prophet Muhammad as the supreme deity clashed with the Asian com-
munist aesthetics of the Mass Games that promoted the national leader as god-like and almost
divine in his revolutionary genius. Pastoral traditions, Islamic influences, and North Korean social-
ism made for strange bedfellows in Barre’s Somalia.
For a welcome ceremony for Ugandan dictator Idi Amin on October 22, 1972, the Somali gov-
ernment performed a North Korean-style Mass Games event. With placards in the back displaying
revolutionary slogans, such as ‘Long Live Comrade Siad’ and ‘Let Us Develop Industry,’ and
images of flourishing Somali irrigation systems, Barre’s regime indigenized Kim Il Sung’s Mass
Games. Based on archival video footage, Amin seemed impressed by the choreographed event.
The sheer visual similarity between North Korean and Somali Mass Games footage most likely
indicates that North Korean specialists directly helped Barre’s regime organize it.32 Somalia was
the unlikely starting point for the diffusion of North Korean-style Mass Games around the
Third World.
In 1973, Amin began seeking North Korean assistance in forming his own version of the Mass
Games. According to a May 1973 report from the U.S. embassy in Rwanda, Amin reportedly
‘talked highly of the high standard of gymnastics in North Korea.’33 The U.S. embassy in Uganda
noted that the DPRK would send four to five instructors in the summer of 1973 to train
Ugandans in the art of the Mass Games. The U.S. embassy in Uganda added to their report, ‘This
will reportedly include the formation of [a] card-section that will be taught how to create the
heroic face of General Amin.’34 In late November 1973, a North Korean-directed Mass Games
instruction course began in the Ugandan region of Eastern Buganda. The District Commissioner
Solomon Jubilee ‘said that the importance of gymnastics exercises cannot be overemphasized’
and that ‘the idea behind such courses is to produce strong, efficient, healthy, and courageous
men and women who can sustain every situation such as the economic war.’35
Beginning in late 1972, Amin’s ‘economic war’ expelled South Asians from Uganda and confis-
cated businesses and property owned by South Asian and European residents. This economic
policy attempted to redistribute Uganda’s wealth to the indigenous population but instead cre-
ated hardship and mass poverty.36 The ‘Ugandization’ of Uganda’s national economy naturally
found parallels with North Korea’s Juche ideology, which stressed self-reliance and self-suffi-
ciency. The editor of the state-run newspaper, Voice of Uganda, noted the similarities between
the two approaches in an op-ed and said ‘that the great Juche idea is a phrase for economic
war.’37 During a May 1974 visit to Uganda, the DPRK’s Foreign Minister Ho Dam stated that
North Korea ‘highly appreciated the progressive reforms introduced by the Second Republic of
Uganda to eliminate the aftermaths of the imperialist and colonialist rule, build the national
economy and culture, and Ugandanize the economy.’38 In addition to finding common ground
on the merits of the Mass Games, the Ugandan and North Korean leaderships also advocated for
similar anti-imperialist economic policies despite their disastrous outcomes.
However, some Ugandan officials did not view the Mass Games as a worthwhile or productive
use of time. Idi Amin held a briefing for district representatives in 1973 in order ‘to dismiss
unfounded and shallow allegations spread by some misguided elements that gymnastics was a
communist oriented game.’ During the meeting, Amin thanked Kim Il Sung for sending the
instructors free of charge but assured the district representatives that the games were not
designed to promote communism. Amin said that ‘by doing gymnastics you keep your body
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physically fit.’ A Voice of Uganda article on the ‘advantages of gymnastics’ stated ‘that gymnastics
is a new feature in Uganda’s history and some people deserve pardon when they sincerely ask
themselves: “What is gymnastics and what is the purpose of gymnastics training?”’ The article
concluded that the ‘Mass Games is one of the most powerful weapons in mobilizing and disci-
plining the people. It is a fine sport in educating the masses morally and physically.’39 Despite
the obvious communist North Korean connection to the Mass Games, the Ugandan government
assured locals that the game merely promoted physical fitness and patriotism.
In October 1973, schoolchildren in Entebbe performed the first ever Ugandan Mass Games on
Ugandan Independence Day. According to the headmaster of the school, ‘Our children liked
[the] gymnastics game and wanted to learn more.’ The headmaster added, ‘Almost every head-
master wanted his children to participate in the gymnastics game. Some even complained why
their children were not invited for training. I have found from the schoolchildren that if one is
involved in gymnastics, he always wants to learn more and more without rest.’40 North Korean-
style Mass Games seemed to have a degree of genuine popularity amongst Ugandan teachers
and students.
A few months later, in January 1974, the second North Korean-style Mass Games performance
took place in Uganda, which commemorated the second anniversary of the founding of Amin’s
Second Republic. According to the Ugandan state-run media, Amin watched the performance
and ‘was highly impressed by their [the North Korean instructors] high standard of cooperation,
discipline, and love for the people of Uganda.’ Amin added that the ‘North Korea instructors had
made many friends in Uganda and earned a good name for their country.’ Amin planned to
invite the North Korean instructors back to Uganda for the following year’s celebrations. The
head of the North Korean mission in Uganda Han Ryong Bin told Amin ‘that the success of the
training of Ugandans in the art of gymnastics was due to the great interest the General [Idi
Amin] had taken in their work.’41 While the North Koreans struggled to export raw materials and
finished products to the Third World, they succeeded in developing specific authoritarian niches,
such as the Mass Games, which they exported around the world. The North Korean leadership
exported these forms of soft power as a way improve their image abroad as a modern socialist
state and establish closer ties with Third World governments.
The North Korean style Mass Games clearly made an impression on the Ugandan leadership
as Amin continued to praise the work of the North Korean instructors in Uganda’s state-run
media. In May 1974, a North Korean delegation visited Uganda and met with Amin. During his
meeting with the officials from the DPRK, Amin complimented the North Korean instructors who
recently left as they ‘helped a lot in the mass mobilization program of Uganda.’ Amin stated that
he wanted to have the instructors back again soon.42 Later, in October 1974, Amin again praised
the work of the North Korean instructors and told the DPRK’s ambassador to Uganda that ‘North
Korea is one of the best friends of Africa because the country has experienced defeating imperia-
lists, colonialists, and neo-colonialists.’43
Amin spread word in Africa that North Korean-taught Mass Games were an effective political
tool. In 1974, Amin ‘said the [North] Koreans had been such good instructors that very many
leaders in East and Central Africa have been making inquiries about how they had managed to
train Ugandans in such a short time.’44 This newfound interest in North Korean-orchestrated
mass celebrations surely encouraged the regime in Pyongyang, which sought an increased pres-
ence in Africa. Due to their initial success in training Ugandans, the DPRK’s reputation for organ-
izing mass celebrations spread throughout sub-Saharan Africa.
The diffusion of North Korean Mass Games in Africa and beyond
North Korea sent Mass Games instructors to Burundi in early October 1974 and trained students
in preparation for President Michel Micombero’s Revolution Day celebrations, held in late
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November 1974.45 According to the U.S. embassy in Bujumbura, the intense daily training ses-
sions disrupted the school schedule of these students but the hard work paid off as the students
held ‘an impressive display for dignitaries with exercises and tableaux depicting [the] achieve-
ments of [the] Micombero era and Burundi’s devotion to African causes.’46 The organization, dis-
cipline, and flashiness of North Korean-style mass celebrations appealed to African leaders and
officials who admired the collectivist aesthetics and mindset of the DPRK. Four years later, the
DPRK government once again sent Mass Games instructors to Burundi. According to the Rodong
Sinmun, the newspaper of the Korean Workers’ Party, the President of Burundi Jean-Baptiste
Bagaza met the North Korean Mass Games instructors in early October 1978 and said, ‘The mass
gymnastic display taught by our Korean friends is of high educational value and greatly encour-
ages the people of Burundi in the struggle of building a new society free from exploitation and
oppression.’ He thanked Kim Il Sung ‘from the bottom of his heart’ for sending a Mass
Gymnastics delegation to Burundi.47
Although the North Korean instructors tried to modify the Mass Games to fit local traditions
and customs, African Mass Games remained heavily influenced by DPRK-style aesthetics and pol-
itical culture. In the summer of 1975, North Korean instructors trained Rwandan students for their
National Day celebrations, which ‘replaced Rwandan folklore presentations with North Korean-
directed mass movement tableaux and flash card spectacles featuring political themes.’
According to the U.S. embassy in Kigali, ‘Although [the] participants were Rwandan and some
effort [was] made to incorporate Rwandan scenes, [the] style and content were neo-
Pyongyang.’48
North Korea later sent Mass Games instructors to Guinea and Togo in 1976 and Madagascar
in 1977. In Guinea, the North Koreas organized ‘impressive’ mass drills, music, and card displays
for the sixth anniversary of the 1970 Portuguese-backed attack on Conakry.49 In Togo, the North
Koreans trained thousands of schoolchildren and a military unit in the art of the Mass Games for
the tenth anniversary of Togolese leader Gnassingbe Eyadema’s rule.50 In 1977, the North
Koreans instructors assisted the Malagasy government in constructing a card show for their
National Day celebrations. According to the U.S. embassy in Madagascar, ‘The card show really
turned the crowd on. North Koreans, who had been drilling all the participants for months, were
very much in evidence and visibly proud of their pupils.’ The North Korean-inspired card show
featured images of Malagasy leader Didier Ratsiraka but also more overtly political content, such
as a picture of Malagasy farmers and soldiers choking the neck of a Western capitalist. The card
show also included anti-imperialist rhetoric such as signs stating, ‘Death to Capitalists,
Imperialists, and Racists’ and ‘Down with Capitalism.’51 Ratsiraka met the North Korean instruc-
tors on June 28, 1977 and ‘spoke of the successes made by the [North] Korean mass gymnastics
display experts sent by the great leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung and expressed satisfaction with
the ever more excellent development of friendly and cooperative relations between [North]
Korea and Madagascar.’52 North Korea used their Mass Games instructors as a cheap but effect-
ive means of spreading their anti-Western and anti-imperialist ideas in Africa.
North Korea continued to deploy Mass Games instructors as a means of spreading its influ-
ence throughout sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1970s. In 1978, the North Koreans once again
assisted the Burundian government in the art of mass celebrations and organized a performance
for the seventeenth anniversary of the ruling Uprona Party, which was ‘flawlessly executed’ and
included a ‘battalion sized army unit which simulated tank, recoilless rifle, and bayonet fighting
to the accompaniment of explosive charges set off at one end of the field.’53
In 1978 and 1979, the North Koreans once again assisted the Rwanda’s ruling party, the
National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRND), in their National Day
celebrations. According to the U.S. embassy in Kigali, the North Koreans transformed primary
schoolchildren from a ‘rag-tag’ group to a ‘regimented’ unit that yelled cheers on cue and the
secondary schoolchildren no longer showcased their livestock at the celebrations but rather
flipped and held North Korean-painted portraits of the Rwandan leader and signs with
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revolutionary slogans. In addition to giving the Rwandan government mobile loudspeakers for
the celebrations, the North Koreans also taught the Rwandan army band, which was infamous
for performing off-key renditions of Christmas music, their brand of revolutionary music.54 In
1979, the U.S. embassy in Kigali concluded, ‘While we ourselves would have preferred more local
folklore and less [North] Korean influence, it is clear that Rwandans take great pleasure and pride
in impressive coordinated Korean-taught activities of hundreds, sometimes thousands, at a
time.’55 Journalist Philip Gourevitch, who visited Rwanda after the Genocide in the mid-1990s,
interviewed individuals who had a less positive recollection of the Mass Games. According to
Gourevitch, ‘Of course, everyone turned out, as the ubiquitous MRND-party enforcers required, to
chant and dance in adulation of the President at mass pageants of political “animation,” but
such mandatory civic cheer could not mask the growing political discontent in much of
Rwandan society.’56 North Korean-imported Mass Games may have mobilized the youth in
Rwanda but their mandatory nature and over-the-top political antics often disillusioned
local peoples.
In the 1979, the North Korean government expanded their Mass Games instruction beyond
Africa as they sent instructors to the South American-Caribbean nation of Guyana.57 Professor
Janis Prince, a former student participant in the Guyanese Mass Games during the 1980s, recalls
the training as primarily consisting of ‘baking in the sun for hours on end, with very little to do’
and remembers her North Korean instructors as ‘stoic and highly disciplined.’ Prince said she
never personally got to know her North Korean instructors and saw them as ‘robotic’ rather than
harsh or kind.58
Predictably, the official Guyanese government opinion on the Mass Games was more positive.
In 1980, Guyana’s state-run newspaper said that the North Korean-imported Mass Games ‘are
here to stay’ and the first official event held in Georgetown’s National Park was apparently ‘a
resounding success.’ After the event, the leader of the North Korean Mass Games instructor
squad, Kim Il Nam, told the local press that ‘Guyanese children are really quick to grasp’ the
complex choreography of the event. However, after the first year, the Guyanese people increas-
ingly took control of the content of their Mass Games. For example, in 1981, Guyana’s Mass
Games featured indigenous folk songs and historical spiritual hymns from African slaves. The
presentation told the story of Guyana’s national development and as one viewer recalled, ‘It was
easy to feel proud.’59 In fact, a recent 2017 letter to the editor in the Guyana Chronicle fondly
remembers the Mass Games of their youth. The letter said, ‘All the schoolchildren would get
ready for Mass Games and enjoy being proud Guyanese, but still complain about the hot sun.
Yet they loved being outside in the fresh air, avoiding class and enjoyed the positive energy of
people smiling all the time.’60 North Korea’s Mass Games tended to gain traction in the Third
World when locals infused their own indigenous traditions and local customs into the
imported event.
The Mass Games caught the eye of another figure in the Caribbean region. Shortly after a
socialist movement toppled the pro-Western government and established a revolutionary gov-
ernment on the Caribbean island nation of Grenada in March 1979, a Grenadian envoy visited
the DPRK in order to form diplomatic ties with Kim Il Sung’s regime. Selwyn Strachan, Grenada’s
Minister of Communications and Works and Labor, was part of this 1979 delegation and said he
was impressed with North Korea’s Mass Games and the precision with which it was performed.
He noted, ‘The training was amazing.’ He tried to bring back the Mass Games to Grenada for the
first anniversary celebration of the Grenadian Revolution. However, North Korean Mass Games
instructors were never sent to Grenada.61
North Korea’s reputation for organizing mass celebrations also reached several other African
countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In May 1984, Pyongyang sent seven Mass Games instructors,
four men and three women, to Burkina Faso and trained students for the first anniversary of the
Burkinabe Revolution. According to a government-run Burkinabe newspaper, the North Korean-
inspired collective movements were ‘the most beautiful spectacle of the celebration.’62
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Pyongyang also sent seven Mass Games instructors to Ghana in December 1984 and trained
nearly five thousand five hundred Ghanaian students for a Ghanaian Revolution ceremony. A
Ghanaian newspaper labeled the Mass Games ‘spectacular gymnastics.’63 North Korean Mass
Games instructors also trained Zambian youth in 1984 for the country’s independence celebra-
tions and met with Zambia’s President Kenneth Kaunda.64
In 1980, Zimbabwe’s leader Robert Mugabe visited Pyongyang and brought along his Minister
of Education and Minister of Youth and Sport in order ‘to see the excellent work which the
North Koreans had done in organizing youth and education and to consider what lessons
Zimbabwe could draw from this.’ Mugabe ‘said that he had been most impressed with the dis-
cipline and efficiency of the various gymnastic and other demonstrations laid on for his benefit
by youth groups.’65 According to one of his former supporters, Mugabe ‘came back almost a dif-
ferent man’ after visiting North Korea in 1980. Mugabe ‘was tremendously impressed by the sta-
diums full of people doing mass calisthenics. He came back wanting to become president, like
Kim.’66 In the mid-1980s, the North Korean government sent Mass Games instructors to help
Mugabe’s regime with their own mass demonstrations. In January 1987, Mugabe met the DPRK’s
ambassador to Zimbabwe, Hi Chun-Ok, and ‘expressed thanks to the Korean mass gymnastic dis-
play experts for their active help to Zimbabwe in gymnastic display.’67 The social mobilization
and sense of loyalty fostered by North Korea’s Mass Games seemingly appealed to Mugabe’s nas-
cent autocracy.
In addition, the North Koreans dispatched instructors to Angola in 1989 for its first national
cultural festival, which featured a large Mass Games event of eight thousand people, and to
Namibia in 1990 for its Independence Day.68 In 1996, North Korean instructors helped the
Nigerian government coordinate Mass Games performances for its Independence Day celebra-
tions. In honor of Nigeria’s Gold Medal in soccer at the 1996 Olympics, one of the scenes fea-
tured a soccer player kicking a ball into the goal. This scene excited spectators so much that
some even ran onto the field and danced with the gymnasts during the performance. Wahab
Rawal, a spectator at the event, said, ‘Our football team was very successful at the Olympic
Games in Atlanta, creating a global sensation, but today’s performance has given our people as
much delight as our football team did.’ Rawal enthusiastically added, ‘I would like to extend my
utmost thanks to Comrade Kim Jong Il, who has sent excellent mass gymnastics specialists to
bring about a second ecstasy in Nigeria.’69
The DPRK government also held international workshops in Pyongyang for foreigners eager
to know ‘the secret,’ as a North Korean book put it, of their Mass Games. From July 18–30, 1989,
the North Korean government held its first international workshop on Mass Games. According to
a North Korean book on the subject, ‘The participants expressed satisfaction with the workshop,
saying that it helped them better understand mass gymnastics through a good combination of
other programs, such as visits to places where the preparation for mass gymnastics was under-
way and experience-swapping sessions.’ A ‘member of an African mass gymnastics inspection
team’ suggested that the DPRK put on a workshop abroad as he had ‘learned much at a special
course on the subject in [North] Korea.’70 The DPRK government also held a second Mass Games
workshop event in Pyongyang in 1992. The Mass Games was one of the few areas in which
Pyongyang eclipsed Seoul in international status.
North Korea’s niche as an effective organizer of mass celebrations popularized the DPRK’s
national image in the Third World. Due to its small size and relatively weak economy, North
Korea could never coerce a foreign country into accepting its political positions in regards to
Korean unification. Thus, Pyongyang deployed Mass Games instructors, mostly free of charge, as
a way in which to attract and persuade Third World governments to side with them vis-a-vis
Seoul in international forums on Korea-related matters. The Mass Games were more popular
than other forms of North Korean soft power, such as literature, in the Third World as it was not
overt propaganda. Many peoples in the Third World seemingly appreciated the physical benefits,
THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW 551
flashy aesthetics, militaristic style, and collectivist approach of the Mass Games. The Mass Games
was authoritarianism hidden under a veneer of regimentation and revolutionary spirit.
Conclusion
Joseph Nye, the Harvard political scientist who first coined the term soft power in the 1980s,
states that a nation’s soft power depends primarily on its resources of ‘culture (in places where it
is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its
foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).’71 Kim Il Sung’s
regime exported the Mass Games as a way to spread the DPRK’s soft power. Culturally, the Mass
Games promoted North Korea’s brand of socialism abroad with its emphasis on mass participa-
tion, organization, discipline, and collectivism. Politically, the Mass Games encouraged state loy-
alty, patriotic fervor, and obedience. In terms of foreign policy, North Korea’s exportation of the
Mass Games championed Third World cooperation and solidarity. Compared to other forms of
North Korean soft power, the Mass Games proved to be more successful in improving the
DPRK’s international status as modern, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist.
One even could argue that Kim Il Sung was the originator of Hallyu (Korean wave), the term
widely associated with the contemporary global dissemination of South Korean pop culture, as
he first distributed the (North) Korean cultural phenomenon of the Mass Games to the Third
World. However, as evidenced by the current popularity of South Korean pop music and dramas,
the ROK was late to the soft power competition but proved to be far more successful in circulat-
ing its cultural products around the world.72 Nonetheless, North Korea’s Mass Games garnered
some degree of support amongst governments in the Third World. Perhaps due to its perceived
foreignness, the Mass Games also gained the sympathy of many local participants who seem-
ingly enjoyed participating in this exotic event taught by instructors from a faraway and little-
known communist country.
During the mid to late 1990s, the DPRK’s economy plummeted and North Koreans suffered a
horrific famine.73 As state resources dwindled, the exportation of the Mass Games predictably
halted. While the DPRK’s government domestically began the ‘Arirang’ Mass Games in 2004,
instructors are no longer sent abroad to train the world’s anti-colonial peoples in this distinctly
North Korean event. Nonetheless, this period of North Korean knowledge circulation with the
Third World should neither be forgotten nor disregarded as purely amusing, bizarre, or curious.
The DPRK interacted with the Third World on a transnational level that involved the circulation
of ideas, peoples, and socialist traditions across national boundaries. When it came to the export-
ation of the Mass Games, the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ was far from hermitic.
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